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Abstract
In the orthodox language of Quantum Mechanics the observer occupies a central posi-
tion and the only "real events" are the measuring results. We argue here that this narrow
view is not forced upon us by the lessons of Quantum Physics. An alternative language,
closer to the intuitive picture of the working physicist in many areas, is not only possible
but warranted. It needs, however, a dierent conceptual picture ultimately implying also
a dierent mathematical structure. Only a rudimentary outline of this picture will be at-
tempted here. The importance of idealizations, unavoidable in any scheme, is emphasized.
A brief discussion of the EPR-phenomenon is added.
1 Language and philosophical extrapolations
Prominent in the vocabulary of Quantum Theory are the words "physics systems", "state",
"observable", "measuring result". The general theory tells us how these terms are represented
in the mathematical scheme and it tells us the following: If a system S is in a state s and we




. I shall not explain the formula since you know it all.
This language has proved to be very ecient in a wide area. Nevertheless we should not
consider it as sacrosanct. There are limits to its usefulness and every word in the vocabulary
is subject to criticism.
Let us start with the word "observable". It suggests that there is an observer. Does this
have to be human being? Certainly in the discussions of the early days of Quantum Mechanics
no other interpretation was intended. One of the concerns of Niels Bohr was epistemology i.e.
the question of what we (humans) can know and how we can communicate. But even if we want
to understand the word observer in a wider sense we must endow him at least with the faculties
of consciousness, intelligence in planning and free will in execution. So there is the question:
does Quantum Physics force us to abandon the old picture of a real outside world, called nature,
which exists separate from our consciousness? Do the nding of atomic physics decide in favour
of some philosophical system like positivism or idealism in contrast to realism? I do not think
so. The raw material of physics, which the theory is supposed to explain, consists of facts
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which can be documented. Nobody claims that in the recognition of a dot on a photographic
plate or of the print out of a computer the quantum mechanical uncertainties play any role.
What is often claimed is that documents are necessarily macroscopic and that amplication to
the macroscopic scale is essential for the creation of a fact. We shall look at this important
point carefully below. It has, however, no bearing on the question about the role of the mind
in the interpretation. No matter what our ultimate philosophical beliefs are, physics by its
very method proceeds from an "as if" realism. Thus one can hardly doubt that facts similar to
measuring results occur in nature irrespective of whether they arise in a planned experiment
and enter the consciousness of an observer. For instance we believe that cosmic rays passing
through a body of water which happens to be at the boiling point may produce lines of vapour
bubbles. A child passing by may wonder about this phenomenon but probably not even notice
it. Thus we may assume that a measuring result is an event whose reality status is no better
than that of other events in nature.
Granting this we must ask: what constitutes an event in the above example? There are
bubbles marking approximate points in space-time and we attribute these to an elementary
quantum process such as
+ atom ! + ion + e +  (1)
which creates a localized disturbance in the superheated liquid and this in turn acts as a germ
of vaporization. Can we separate the elementary process (1) as a closed process from the
subsequent macroscopic amplication? What if the temperature of the water was a few degrees
lower and no bubbles were formed? This brings us back to the question about the role of
amplication. Clearly we have to distinguish between documents and facts. While the former
are needed for the unequivocal establishment and communication of a result of observation
i.e. are indispensable on the epistemological side we should recognize that physics transcends
epistemology. In physics we try to extrapolate from what we know or even can know to form
a coherent picture of the world using criteria like reasonableness, simplicity . . . . Observations
are a tool and a check, not the ultimate purpose. The assumption of (1) as an individual fact
is an idealization which has to be judged by its reasonableness.
2 Individuals and ensembles.
Niels Bohr is sometimes regarded as a crown witness for positivism: his emphasis on episte-
mology seems to provide some justication for this. But Bohr disclaimed such a label and
reportedly felt unhappy about this misunderstanding of the message of Quantum Mechanics.
Indeed in his writings you nd no trace of a doubt about the real existence of electrons and
atoms but only about our ability of assigning simple attributes to them. One central point
of Bohr's argument is that Quantum Theory introduces a discrete element into physics which
implies not only the stability of atoms but also the indivisibility of quantum processes whether
it be a quantum jump in an atom or the passage of a particle between source and detector
in the double slit experiment. Any subdivision of such a process, the attempt to describe
it as a continuous development in space and time, cannot have an objective meaning. The
Schrodinger equation does not describe the individual process. It describes the continuous
change of probabilities for possible facts not the fact itself. Similarly the formulation of quan-
tum mechanical statements quoted at the beginning, which is essentially due to von Neumann,
refers to the statistical behavior in an ensemble: the individual fact, called "measuring result",
remains unresolved. This calls attention to the division problem. What can be singled out as
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an individual? This question applies in parallel to matter and to events. To say that matter
is composed of atoms and an atom is composed of electrons, protons and neutrons is obvi-
ously a coarse picture. The Pauli principle implies that the "constituents" cannot be regarded
as individuals and even where this principle does not enter, e.g. in the case of the hydrogen
atom, the composition picture is only an analogy providing a useful model for approximations.
An individual part of matter becomes precisely dened only as an asymptotic notion which
can be arbitrarily well approximated by isolation. The simplest such individuals are particles
(including stable, compact objects like a crystal). Their internal structure is rigidly xed by
(quantum) laws of nature. Similarly an individual event is an asymptotic notion. The simplest
type of event is a collision process between particles, well isolated from other matter and closed
by the spatial separation of the reaction products. Its mental decomposition into subevents or
"virtual events" (as in Quantum Field Theory) is a useful model but no individual existence
of the virtual events can be claimed. This hinging of basic concepts to asymptotic situations
which are only approximately realizable emphasizes the need for idealizations. Idealizations
cannot be avoided if we want to talk about any subdivision of the universe
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though this does
not necessarily have to be done in terms of particles and collisions. Considering for instance the
regime of an extended medium of high density we may dene an individual event as a signicant
deviation from local equilibrium. In the orthodox interpretation the idealization begins with
the cut between the "quantum system" and the observing instruments described classically and
continues with Bohr's eort to dene a "closed quantum process" as a complete description of
the experimental arrangement, a task which demands judicious judgment as to what is relevant
and what is not. This is well adapted to laboratory situations when we have to consider both
articles and macroscopic hardware. But it leaves open the task of translating a description of
the apparatus into the mathematical representatives of the state prepared and the observable
measured and it does not answer the question of why the interaction between apparatus and
quantum system leads in each individual case to a "measuring result". Again the occurance of
such events has to be postulated. The attempt to explain this as a consequence of the formalism
in the theory of measurement, for instance by the study of decoherence, goes only part of the
way (see below).
So far our only change from the orthodox view has been to replace the notion of "measuring
result" by the more general notion of an "event" which is considered as a fact independent of the
presence of an observer. This has, however, important consequences. An event is irreversible.
It is the transition from a possibility to a fact. We are raised in the belief that the fundamental
laws do not stipulate an arrow of time but are invariant under time reversal. The explanation
of the manifest irreversibility of processes around us is delegated to statistical mechanics which,
starting from fundamental laws invariant under time reversal, arrives at irreversible behaviour in
the macroscopic domain
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. If we believe that this is the only mechanism by which irreversibility
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John Bell's quest for "beables" which can be precisely dened under any circumstances and his criticism of
Quantum Theory on the grounds that it is not enough to achieve agreement with experiments "for all practical
purposes" (FAPP) disregards the possibility that with increasing insistence on precision the subdivision of the
universe must become necessarily coarser and the description less detailed.
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The miracle by which this is achieved is the following. Going over to a "coarse grained" description one
nds that dierent macroscopic states have very dierent statistical weights. Starting with a state of low weight
it is therefore overwhelmingly probable that later on it develops into a state of higher weight. There remains the
question of why we only want to draw conclusions from a given situation at an earlier time to that at later times
and not vice versa and why we usually encounter the situation that at the early time the state has low statistical
weight. In a laboratory situation the latter circumstance can be attributed to the experimenter starting his
investigation. On the larger scale it must be blamed ultimately on cosmology telling us that observed large
deviations from equilibrium did not arise from an earlier situation closer to equilibrium as a consequence of a
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can arise we must conclude that the elementary process, even if isolated, cannot be regarded as
real but needs the macroscopic amplication before we can talk about a fact. This argument
has played a role in many discussions of the quantum mechanical measuring process. Niels
Bohr refers to it in rather careful and slightly enigmatic formulations, for instance: "Far from
implying a special diculty, the irreversible amplication eects on which the registration of
atomic objects depends remind us of the essential irreversibility inherent in the concept of
observation". Now, if we do not want to place the concept of observation into the center of
physics, we must ask ourselves: what would be the natural picture if we claim that there are
discrete, real events on any scale?
Starting from this idea we come almost unavoidably to an evolutionary picture of physics.
There is an evolving pattern of events with causal links connecting them. At any stage the
"past" consists of the part which has been realized, the "future" is open and allows possibilities
for new events. Altogether we have a growing graph or, using another mathematical language,
a growing category whose objects are events and whose (directed) arrows are the causal links.
We assume further that the relation to space-time is provided by the events. Each event marks
roughly a region in space-time, the sharpness of which depends on the nature of the event.
No independent localization properties of links is assumed. The reason for this may be seen
in the case of low density where the scheme can most easily be compared with the customary
quantum theoretical description. In this case the causal links correspond to particles, the
events to collision processes between them. To attribute localization to a particle between two
processes would contradict basic experiences in Quantum Mechanics as emphasized by Bohr's
concept of indivisibility and mathematically described by the spreading of the wave packet for
the center of mass motion over a large volume. Thus, after the source event of emission we have
roughly a spherical wave function. It should not be interpreted as relating to the probability
for the changing position of a point-like particle but rather to the probability for the space-
time location of the collision center in a subsequent event. Only after the realization of this
target event we may (retrospectively) assign an approximate world line and momentum to the
particle. Let us suppose here that customary space-time in which patterns of events and links
can be embedded has been independently dened
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. A pattern of events and links prior to a
given time is a history.
The quantum laws concern two aspects. On the one hand they must determine the intrinsic
structure of links and events (for instance the internal wave functions or structure functions
of particles). On the other hand they must give probability laws for the formation of specic
patterns, including the positions of collision centers. No attempt will be made here to formulate
these laws. In the low density example they can be adapted from standard procedure in
quantum theory. Let us sketch a strongly simplied version of this which shows some essential
aspects. To each type of link  (here a type of particle) we have an associated Hilbert space
H

and we may consider all the subsequently mentioned spaces as subspaces of the Fock space
generated from the H

of all types. Consider for simplicity "maximal" events (corresponding to
the strongest possible decisions). They specify their backward links completely. If the event has
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outgoing channel
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. This vector is, however, not a product vector but a linear combination of
large uctuation but from one of still lower weight.
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In a more ambitious analysis one might hope to use the geometry of patterns as a substitute for space-time.
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We made the further simplifying assumption that the choice of a specic outgoing channel is included in
the characteristics of the event.
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such. Its expansion into a sum of product vectors depends on a choice of bases in the factor
spaces. The selection of a particular product vector is realized only by the subsequent events
since links become established only after both source and target event are realized. A space-like
surface not passing through any event denes a "subjective past" consisting of the pattern of
all earlier events. Among these events there are saturated ones for which all forward links
are absorbed by some other event inside this subjective past and there are others still having
free valence links for the formation of future events. To such a subjective past we associate a
state which summarizes the probability predictions for possible extensions of the pattern to the
future. In our simplied picture the state depends only on the subpattern of the unsaturated
past events. As the space-like surface is shifted to the future the associated state changes as
new events appear. This change, analogous to the "reduction of the wave packet", corresponds
to the transition from a possibility to a fact. Let us illustrate this in the example of the gure in
which the wavy line indicates the chosen space-like surface. We are interested in the extension
of the past history by the pattern of events 4 and 5 and the newly established links. The
temporal order of 1, 2, 3 is irrelevant but it is assumed that no other events of the past can













































are specic unit vectors in the subspaces H






vectors in the tensor product spaces of the new outgoing channels. The constant c,c' together
with the selection of the backward ties i.e. the vectors ji determine the probability for a single






. This yields a vector whose square length gives this probability. To obtain the joint









square the length of the resulting vector. This joint probability shows correlations even though
these events may lie space-like to each other. They are due to the fact that the two events have
backward causal links to a common source (event 3). Moreover the vector 
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determined by





before both events are realized and thus it
is not possible to assign individual "states" to the not yet established links. It is this feature
which distinguishes the joint probability for events from the case of classical correlations which
result if there is an individual state for each link (possibly unknown) and the correlations are
between these states of links. A prime example is the EPR-phenomenon (see below).
The decision for realization of one possible pattern of events is a free choice of nature limited
only by the probability assignment.
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The amount of freedom thus accorded to nature is larger
than in the standard view where the experimenter forces nature to decide only on the answer
to a proposed question. It must be stressed, however, that also in the standard use of quantum
theoretical formalism the element of free choice by nature cannot be eliminated. It is only
pushed to the rear by focusing on ensembles instead of individual cases. Thus one may derive
from the dynamical law governing the time development of "states" (representing ensembles)
that in the case of complex systems the density matrix becomes very fast eectively diagonal in
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One can speculate whether the decision between a large number of alternatives may be decomposed into a








Figure 1: Pattern formation
suitably chosen collective coordinates whatever the initial state may have been. "Eectively"
means that in no realistic experiment the o-diagonal terms will play a role ("decoherence").
One concludes then that this nal ensemble may be thought of as a mixture of subensembles
in each of which the collective coordinates have specic values. This is perfectly correct as
far as statistical predictions for subsequent measurements are concerned. It does, however, not
explain the fact that in each individual case nature has decided for one specic set of values (e.g.
the position of a dot on a photographic plate), a decision not controlled by the experimenter
and not described by the time development of the density matrix. A striking example of
the ambiguities involved in the step from the statistics of an ensemble to conclusions about
individual cases will be discussed below. It is interesting to note that Dirac advanced the idea
of a free choice of nature in this context in 1927 at the 5th Solvay Congress but was dissuaded
by Bohr who emphasized the decisive role of the observer.
3 Comparison with standard procedure.
To compare the degree of compatibility of the scheme with the standard procedure of Quantum
Physics let us rst look at a process like (1) without subsequent amplication eects. The links
to the past are a single  -meson and a single atom far separated from all other matter. In
the conventional treatment we have a Fock space of incoming particles. The initial state is
described as a tensor product of two single particle wave functions of the respective center of
mass motion (we treat the atom as a single particle). The nal state is described as a vector
in Fock space resulting from the application of the S-matrix to this tensor product. It is a sum
of terms describing the dierent channels. We write as usual S = 1 + iT and, for a particular
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